In January 1993, the Australian government sent just under one thousand young men and women to serve under American command in a violent, impoverished, starving society. Most males over the age of twelve either carried or had access to a gun, and most Somali men had been fighting a vicious civil war for years.
Australian soldiers and their teams had to gain control of the streets of Baidoa and surrounding towns. This contest was not ‘find, fight and kill’ warfare. There was no decisive victory or defeat. The aim was to detect ‘the bad boys’ and deter and de-escalate their violence rather than escalate hostilities to success through ‘body count’. This mode of operation was not community policing by soldiers either. It involved adjusting attitudes forcefully and assuring uncomfortable consequences for bad behaviour and ultimately lethal responses to armed challenges.
The world looked over their shoulders. Corporals and diggers had to make split-second decisions to open or hold fire. Holding fire when provoked by punks constituted disciplined professional performance. Opening fire before understanding the situation, especially against unarmed provocateurs, constituted unprofessional conduct and possible condemnation, even criminal charges. These young Australians carried the international reputation of Australia and its army on their shoulders. Their actions would either enhance that reputation or create controversy, negative publicity and, potentially, international embarrassment and condemnation.
After asserting a presence through rigorous patrolling and search-and-clear urban and rural operations, the Australians deterred a range of marauders from interfering with UN and NGO humanitarian activities, keeping expatriate staff safe and killing and wounding several Somali shooters in surprise clashes. After adjusting their own attitudes to balance aggression and compassion, fight leaders and their diggers forcefully adjusted Somali attitudes, secured a stalemate, and then took control for the time they were in Somalia Australian soldiers individually and collectively helped a traumatised society needing a ‘fair go’ and gave ordinary Somali men, women and children trying to survive a little bit of hope.
Justin Chadwick – Sabretache –
Contributor to the official history of Australia’s involvement in Somalia and author of the Army History Unit’s monograph Australian Force Somalia 1992-1993, Bob Breen is well placed to write an accessible book on the subject. In Chasing Bandits in the Badlands, he endeavours to highlight the importance and contribution of junior leaders and their teams to the operation. What is demonstrated is that the professionalism of the infantry, through clear rules of
engagement and mission command, was prevalent despite the intervening period of extended peacetime. Breen notes that, as with most military histories, the action is the focus while predominantly it is the times of inaction that predominate. This, he argues, is as important as successful contacts and shows the importance of the section leader and effective patrolling.
For those readers who are not enamoured with reading official histories the combination of an official historian who has written on the subject and a concise
and readable format would appear ideal. In Chasing Bandits in the Badlands, Bob Breen has achieved just that.